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Military Spending, the Peace Dividend,
and Fiscal Adjustment
HAMID DAVOODI, BENEDICT CLEMENTS,
JERALD SCHIFF, and PETER DEBAERE*
This paper decomposes the sources of the peace dividend into global, regional,
and country-specific factors, and analyzes their relative importance. It finds
that the easing of international and regional tensions and the existence of IMF-
supported adjustment programs are systematically related to lower military
spending and a higher share of nonmilitary spending in total government
outlays. The easing of international tensions and of regional tensions since the
end of the Cold War and the existence of IMF-supported adjustment programs
account for 66 percent, 26 percent, and 11 percent of the decline in military
spending, respectively. Furthermore, fiscal adjustment has implied a larger cut
in military spending of countries with IMF-supported programs. [JEL H10,
H50, H56]
C
hanges in international relations and the end of the Cold War continue to
stimulate economic research on the determinants of military spending, as
well as on the relationship between military spending, other public sector outlays,
and private consumption. Perceived or actual reductions in international tensions
associated with the end of the Cold War have led to discussions regarding the
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magnitude of the “peace dividend” and its use (Gleditsch and others, 1996;
Clements, Gupta, and Schiff, 1997; Schiff, Gupta, and Clements, 1998; and
Rockoff, 1998). At the same time, the need for fiscal adjustment in many coun-
tries has led to an increasing focus on unproductive spending in general, including
excessive military spending (Chu and others, 1995; and IMF, 1997).
These studies have identified the peace dividend as the observed reduction in
military spending over time. A shortcoming of this approach is that it does not
allow one to identify, per se, the change in military spending attributable exclu-
sively to reduced international tensions or other factors reflecting a more peaceful
environment. That is, because military spending is determined by a host of
factors—including those influencing fiscal policy more generally—identification
of the peace dividend can only be done in the context of a model capturing the
underlying forces driving variations in military spending, including the easing of
international and regional tensions.
The first purpose of this paper is to fill this gap in the literature by measuring
the sources of the peace dividend and their relative importance in the context of a
more general model describing the determinants of military spending. Building on
Hewitt (1991, 1992, and 1993), an analytical framework is presented in which
military and overall government spending are determined jointly. The framework
is used to decompose sources of the peace dividend into global, regional, and
country-specific factors. The global factor is common to all countries and
measures the extent of international tensions. This source of the peace dividend
is, therefore, defined as the drop in military spending due specifically to the
easing of international tensions. The regional source is defined as the drop in a
country’s military spending due to reductions in regional or local tensions.
Finally, country-specific factors comprise both economic and noneconomic vari-
ables. The drop in military outlays due to variation in these factors determines the
source of the peace dividend that is country specific.
A second contribution of this paper is an assessment of the impact of IMF-
supported adjustment programs on military spending. While these issues have been
addressed by other authors (De Masi and Lorie, 1989; Abed and others, 1998;
Schiff, Gupta, and Clements, 1998; and Gupta, McDonald, and Ruggiero, 1998),
they have not done so in the context of an analytical framework describing the
determinants of government and military spending more generally. In this paper, a
quantitative assessment is provided of the impact of IMF-supported adjustment
programs per se on military spending and its share in total government outlays. The
framework also allows one to quantify a measure of the peace dividend defined as
higher nonmilitary spending as a result of lower military spending.1 Other studies
have defined the peace dividend in terms of other economic gains from lower mili-
tary spending, such as higher economic growth and higher private investment
(Knight, Loayza, and Villanueva, 1996), higher saving (Russett and Slemrod,
1993), higher social spending (Gupta, McDonald, and Ruggiero, 1998), lower
1This measure, along with others, has been used in descriptive studies of the peace dividend
(Clements, Gupta, and Schiff, 1997; Gupta, McDonald and Ruggiero, 1998).
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deficits and tax burdens (De Masi and Lorie, 1989; Lee and Vedder, 1996;
Gleditsch and others, 1996; and Clements, Gupta, and Schiff, 1997).
I. The Analytical Framework
The analytical framework, based on Hewitt (1991, 1992, and 1993), adopts a
public-choice approach for analyzing the relationship between military spending
and overall government spending. Defense spending or its output—national secu-
rity—is, from a country’s perspective, a pure public good requiring government
provision. The determination of military spending is modeled as a government
optimization problem. In particular, the political leadership decides on both
overall government spending (the size of the budget) as well as the mix between
military and nonmilitary spending. 
The welfare function of the leadership is as follows:
W = f (C, M, O, Z), (1)
where
C = private consumption;
M = military spending;
O = nonmilitary government spending; and
Z = state variables.
State variables affect the leadership’s choice of the level of military and overall
government spending and the relative weights the leadership may place on either
type of spending. Overall government spending is given by the following identity:
G = M + O. (2)
Abstracting from private investment, the economy-wide budget constraint is
determined by the available resources in the economy:
G = Y – CA – C, (3)
where Y represents the value of gross domestic product and CA the current account
surplus.
To get a simple analytical solution, a Cobb-Douglas specification for equation





Choices of M and G that maximize equation (4) subject to equations (2) and (3)
will result in:
(5) MG = +
β
βγ
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Equations (5) and (6) show the simultaneous relationship between military
spending and overall government spending. Higher military spending will lead to
higher overall spending and vice versa. And higher external resources (a lower
current account surplus) will increase overall government spending directly and
military spending indirectly. Dividing both equations by Y and allowing for the




where f1 and f2 are functions. Equations (7) and (8) form a structural model. The
model also indicates that what distinguishes the military spending equation from
the overall government spending equation is the role of external current account
surplus in determining overall government outlays. In the empirical section of the
paper, additional identification restrictions are allowed via the state variables, Z.




where h1 and h2 are functions.
II. The Econometric Model 
In the structural model, equations (7) and (8) are specified in log-linear form as
follows:
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m = ratio of military spending to GDP,
y = real per capita GDP,
CW = civil war (dummy variable),
IW = international war (dummy variable),
h = measure of international tensions,
r = measure of regional tensions,
IMF = existence of IMF-supported adjustment program 
(dummy variable),
g = ratio of overall government spending to GDP,
ur = urbanization ratio,
age = old age dependency ratio,
ca = ratio of external current account surplus to GDP.2
and uit and υ it are error terms. The subscript (it) for each variable refers to country
and time period, respectively, as the paper makes use of a panel data set of coun-
tries over time. The structural model (equations (11) and (12)) shows the simul-
taneity between military spending and overall government spending, as well as the
presence of state variables. In equation (11), state variables consist of three
dummy variables, real per capita GDP, country-specific factors (α i), and two
distinct measures of military tensions.3 The inclusion of the latter two variables,
along with the dummy variable representing the existence of an IMF-supported
adjustment program, distinguishes this paper from earlier work on determinants of
military spending. In equation (12), state variables consist of real per capita GDP,
the urbanization ratio, the age dependency ratio, the ratio of current account
balance to GDP, country-specific factors (β i), and the IMF dummy variable. These
variables are routinely employed in studies of determinants of government size
(see Heller and Diamond, 1990; Rodrik, 1996; Hewitt and van Rijckeghem, 1995;
and Clements, Rodriguez, and Schwartz, 1998). They also constitute additional
restrictions that help econometric identification of the military spending equation
from the government spending equation in the structural model. For example, the
two measures of military tensions affect overall government spending only to the
extent that they affect military spending. Hence, they are entered only in the mili-
tary spending equation. The same argument applies to the dummy variables for
civil and international wars. By contrast, the IMF dummy variable is allowed to
affect both types of spending directly since the implementation of an IMF-
log log log  log
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2This variable is not in a logarithmic form, since the current account balance can take on positive or
negative values.
3The dummy variables for civil and international wars and other variables are explained in the next
section of the paper.
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supported adjustment program presumably affects both the expenditure level and
its composition. This issue is investigated empirically later in the paper.




where ε it and η it are error terms. All the explanatory variables in equations (13)
and (14) are the state variables that appear in the structural model.
III. The Data
There are four widely known databases on military spending. These are compiled
by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the International Institute for
Strategic Studies (IISS), and the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO). These
databases suffer from shortcomings related to the confidential nature of military
activities as well as the lack of a single broadly accepted definition of military
spending.4 The annual military expenditure data used in this paper are taken from
SIPRI’s yearbooks, which apply a consistent definition of military expenditure
across countries. The SIPRI definition of military spending includes military
pensions, military interest payments, and paramilitary expenditures, but excludes
police expenditures. Military aid to other nations is included in the military expen-
ditures of the donor country. The nominal military spending data, denominated in
local currency, is divided by the local-currency nominal GDP data from the WEO
database to obtain the ratio of military expenditures to GDP. The military spending
data, along with data on other variables, form a panel data set of up to 130 coun-
tries for the 1972–94 period. Transition economies are not included in the panel
data set, however, since either military spending data or other variables are
missing or of questionable quality for the period in question. For similar reasons,
countries whose boundaries changed over time (for example, Germany and
Yemen) are excluded. These restrictions reduce the number of countries to 100;
see the Appendix for a list of these countries.
Real per capita GDP and the ratio of the current account balance to GDP are
taken from the WEO database. The old age dependency ratio and the degree of
urbanization are from the World Bank’s Social Indicators database. These variables
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4See Happe and Wakeman-Linn (1994) and Gupta, McDonald, and Ruggiero (1998) for an analysis
of different measures of military spending. The latter documents a downward trend in military spending
in the 1990s regardless of the data set used. 
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higher outlays are needed to support an aging population and provide services for
the larger population in urban areas. A negative coefficient is expected for the
current account surplus since higher external borrowing can finance higher govern-
ment spending. The civil war and international war dummy variables were
constructed on the basis of Sivard (1993) for the years prior to 1992 and the SIPRI
yearbook for the years after 1992.5 For every year each dummy variable takes on
the value of one if there is a war and zero otherwise. The data for overall govern-
ment spending refer to central government spending—taken from the WEO—and
divided by GDP to get the ratio of government spending to GDP.
Measuring International Tensions
Two indicators of international tensions are used to measure the global source of
the peace dividend: the so-called Doomsday Clock and the number of nuclear
explosions by major nuclear powers. Both indicators vary over time and not across
countries, which makes them ideal for the purpose of this paper. The Doomsday
Clock measures the number of minutes until “midnight” and is taken from the
home page of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists.6 A higher number indicates an
easing of international tensions, which is expected to be associated with lower
military spending.7 Box 1 shows the major events that have caused the resetting
of the clock over the 1972–94 period, the period under study. The 1972–94 period
is of particular interest for this paper since it represents 50 percent of the occasions
that the clock has been reset from June 1947 through June 1998.8 It is, therefore,
a period that provides a reasonable test of the Doomsday Clock as a measure of
international tensions. The second indicator of international tensions measures the
number of nuclear weapon explosions by the five major nuclear powers (the
United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia/the former Soviet Union, and
China) in a given year and is taken from the SIPRI yearbook. A lower number
indicates an easing of international tensions and is expected to be associated with
lower military spending. 
The two indicators are highly correlated; the simple correlation coefficient
between the two indicators is –0.62, which is significant at the 1 percent level and
has the expected sign. The high, but less-than-perfect, correlation coefficient
implies that the two indicators are measuring somewhat different aspects of inter-
national tensions. Indeed, the Doomsday Clock is a subjective indicator, reflecting
Hamid Davoodi,Benedict Clements,Jerald Schiff,and Peter Debaere
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5An international war is distinguished from a civil war by the involvement of more than one country.
The quantitative limit for inclusion was set at 1,000 casualties in both cases.
6The address is http://www.bullatomsci.org.
7The Bulletin devised the Doomsday Clock, the universal symbol of the nuclear age, in order to mark
nuclear danger. The Bulletin was first published in December 1945 and the Doomsday Clock appeared for
the first time on the cover of the June 1947 issue of the bulletin. The hands of the clock have been moved
forward and backward since 1947, reflecting changes in international tensions and the development of the
nuclear age. The hands were moved 16 times from June 1947 through June 1998.
8On June 1998, the clock was reset from fourteen minutes to midnight, which was in effect since
1995, to nine minutes to midnight in order to mark the series of nuclear explosions carried out by India
and Pakistan in May 1998 and the failure of world diplomacy in arresting nuclear proliferation.
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many variables considered by the Bulletin’s board of directors when deciding on
the exact number of minutes, whereas the second indicator is objective and
measures only the number of nuclear explosions. Therefore, each indicator may
produce different econometric results and a different magnitude of the global
peace dividend. 
Reflecting the simple correlation coefficient, the historical evolution of the
two indicators shows similar trends, with tensions increasing from 1972 until the
mid-1980s, and easing subsequently (Figures 1 and 2). A quadratic time-trend
fitted to each indicator clearly shows the change in trends (see also Table 1). The
R-squared of each fitted relationship is in excess of 0.70, which indicates that the
changing trend in international tensions is statistically significant as well.9
Figures 1 and 2 also show the persistence of the two indicators, which is an
important aspect of the Cold War: when international tensions are high (low), they
tend to remain high (low). This is supported by the fact that the simple correlation
coefficient between the Doomsday Clock and its lagged value is 0.90 and between
the nuclear explosions and its own lagged value is 0.86.10
Box 1. Changes in International Tensions According
to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 1972–94
1972: Twelve minutes to midnight. The United States and the Soviet Union sign the first Strategic
Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; progress toward SALT II is
anticipated.
1974: Nine minutes to midnight. SALT talks reach an impasse. India develops a nuclear weapon.
1980: Seven minutes to midnight. The deadlock in U.S.-Soviet arms talks continues; nationalis-
tic wars and terrorist actions increase; the rift between rich and poor nations grows wider.
1981: Four minutes to midnight. Both superpowers develop more weapons for fighting a nuclear
war. Terrorist actions; repression of human rights; conflicts in Afghanistan, Poland, and South
Africa add to world tension.
1984: Three minutes to midnight. The arms race accelerates. 
1988: Six minutes to midnight. The United States and the Soviet Union sign a treaty to eliminate
intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF); superpower relations improve; more nations actively
oppose nuclear weapons. 
1990: Ten minutes to midnight. (In October 1989, the clock is redesigned to expand the definition
of world security.) Democratic movements in Eastern Europe shatter the myth of monolithic com-
munism; the Cold War ends.
1991: Seventeen minutes to midnight. The United States and the Soviet Union sign the long-
stalled Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and announce further unilateral cuts in tactical
and strategic nuclear weapons.
Source: http://www.bullatomsci.org/clock/doomsdayclock.html
9The estimated parameters of each quadratic trend are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
10The higher correlation coefficient for the Doomsday Clock is an indication of its construction. As
Figure 1 shows, the number of minutes until midnight stays unchanged for a number of years.
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Figure 1.  Doomsday Clock, 1972–94
y = 0.10x2 – 401x + 397773
R2 = 0.77
Minutes to midnight
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y = –0.23x2 + 895x – 884864
R2 = 0.86
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Measuring Regional Tensions
Implementation of the model of the previous section requires an indicator of
regional tensions, an indicator that is shared by all countries in a given region but
distinct from that measuring international tensions. Asuitable candidate that satis-
fies these requirements is the average of the ratio of military spending to GDP of
neighboring countries.11 For every country, this indicator has been constructed as
the unweighted average of military spending to GDP of all countries that share a
border with the given country. To our knowledge, this is the first time that such a
variable has been constructed and used as a determinant of military spending in an
econometric model.12 It is intended to measure aspects of the movements in a
nation’s military spending owing to perceived threats from its neighbors, as
11Use of regional dummies may be another option, but a dummy variable is merely a measure of one’s
ignorance about why military spending differs between regions.
12The empirical literature on business cycles and economic growth, to name a few, has made use of such
variables reflecting strategic complementarities among economic activities, agents, and spillovers across
borders. See Cooper and Haltiwagner (1993); Moreno and Trehan (1997); and Easterly and Levine (1998).
See also Bayoumi, Hewitt, and Schiff (1995) for a simulation of a large macroeconometric model that demon-
strates a significant positive externality from a coordinated reduction in military expenditures across the globe.
Table 1. Summary Statistics: Measures of Spending and 
International Tensions
(Unweighted average)
1972–94 1972–85 1986–94 1972–89 1990–94
Average
Ratio of military spending 
to GDP (in percent) 4.0 4.2 3.5 4.1 3.6
Neighbors’ ratio of military spending 
to GDP (in percent) 4.5 4.7 4.1 4.6 3.9
Ratio of government spending
to GDP (in percent) 28.0 27.5 28.9 27.7 29.2
Doomsday Clock (in minutes) 8.4 7.5 10.1 6.8 15.3
Nuclear explosions (number) 41.5 52.1 22.1 48.6 9.8
Average annual percent change 
Ratio of military spending to GDP1 –0.8 1.5 –2.1 0.1 –3.8
Neighbors’ ratio of military spending to GDP1 –1.5 0.7 –3.1 –0.6 –3.0
Ratio of government spending to GDP1 0.9 1.6 0.4 1.1 2.1
Doomsday Clock2 5.5 –8.9 26.3 –0.9 27.3
Nuclear explosions2 –3.8 –1.8 –6.7 0.3 –17.7
Sources: WEO; SIPRI; and the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists.
1Average annual percent change is obtained by regressing the natural log of the variable on a
constant and time trend. Number of observations for the 1972–94 period is 1,825.
2Averages of year-over-year percent changes.
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nuclear powers. In fact, the data assembled here reveal that there is little correla-
tion between international and regional tensions, and that they are indeed separate
influences.13 The evolution of military spending and neighbors’military spending
is shown in Figure 3. The two closely track each other with a Gulf War–inspired
increase in spending in the late 1980s, accompanied by a subsequent decline. By
contrast, government spending shows an upward trend in the post-1990 period
(Figure 4). The implied increase in nonmilitary spending after 1990 may represent
the peace dividend, as some studies have assumed, but it may also be due to other
factors that are not related to or caused by lower military spending.
Measuring the Existence of IMF-Supported Programs
The IMF dummy variable, which marks the presence of an IMF-supported adjust-
ment program in a country for a given year, was constructed based on the criteria
in De Masi and Lorie (1989).14 It takes a value of unity if there is a program in a
given year and zero otherwise. A country is considered to have a program in a
given year if (1) in case of a one-year program, at least six months of the program
were in that year; (2) for longer-term programs, if at least five months are covered
by the year; or (3) in case a program is terminated and a new program begins in
Hamid Davoodi,Benedict Clements,Jerald Schiff,and Peter Debaere
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13The simple correlation coefficient between the neighbors’ military spending to GDP ratio, on the
one hand, and the Doomsday Clock and the number of nuclear explosions, on the other, is –0.06 and 0.08,
respectively.
14See Hewitt and van Rijckeghem (1995), and Clements, Rodriguez, and Schwartz (1998) for a
similar methodology.













 04 Davoodi.qxd  12/17/01  1:35 PM  Page 300MILITARY SPENDING,THE PEACE DIVIDEND,AND FISCAL ADJUSTMENT
301
the same year, the total number of months with a program is at least five. It should
be noted that measuring the impact of an IMF-supported program with a yearly
dummy implicitly assumes that programs have no lasting impact on military or
total expenditures. However, the importance of this assumption is mitigated some-
what by the fact that in many countries IMF-supported programs have succeeded
one another and some programs last three years.
Figure 5 shows that there is a steady increase in the number of programs
throughout the period, rising from a low of 12 in 1975 to a high of 45 in 1994.
There were fewer program countries during the 1972–85 period (an average of 23)
compared with the 1986–94 period (an average of 34). In the next section, the
significance of an IMF-supported adjustment program for explaining movements
in military and nonmilitary spending is investigated.
IV. Econometric Results
The econometric results are based on the structural model (equations (11) and
(12)) and the reduced-form model (equations (13) and (14)). The structural model
is estimated by the method of Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) and the
reduced-form model by ordinary least squares.
Structural Model vs. Reduced-Form Model: An Overview
The GMM estimation technique is used to address the underlying problems of auto-
correlation and heteroskedasticity associated with estimating a structural panel
model with endogenous variables. The instruments used in the model are the
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and structural models facilitates an analysis of the direct and indirect influences on
the two endogenous variables. In particular, the structural model separates the influ-
ences of the exogenous variables on military spending into two channels: an indirect
one (via government spending) and a direct one (via the military spending equation).
The reduced form provides a convenient summary of the combined effects. Finally,
estimation of the structural model with an instrumental variable technique provides
point estimates of the response of military spending to exogenous changes in
government spending, and the response of government spending to exogenous
changes in military spending; and more importantly, it allows one to conduct certain
policy analyses that cannot be addressed using the reduced-form model. 
For example, the structural model can answer the following question: Does
the share of military spending in total government spending fall in response to
exogenous contractionary fiscal policy? If the answer is negative, military
spending is said to be resilient, whereby reductions in total government spending
fall disproportionally on the nonmilitary component of total government spending.
Similarly, the structural model can inform the policymaker as to whether the share
of nonmilitary spending in total government spending increases in response to
exogenous reductions in military spending.
The Structural Model
The structural model (equations (11) and (12)) is estimated using the two different
measures of international tensions: the Doomsday Clock and number of nuclear
explosions. Regressions are estimated on demeaned data using as instruments all
Hamid Davoodi,Benedict Clements,Jerald Schiff,and Peter Debaere
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instruments are: a constant, real per capita GDP, old age dependency ratio, urban-
ization ratio, ratio of current account to GDP, civil war dummy, international war
dummy, the Doomsday Clock, number of nuclear explosions, neighbor’s ratio of
military spending to GDP, and IMF program dummy.15 Results are shown in Table
2. Sargan’s test shows that the null hypothesis of the validity of instruments (for
example, their exogeneity) is not rejected at the 1 or 5 percent level. The easing of
international tensions is associated with reductions in military spending.16 The
estimated coefficients on the Doomsday Clock and number of nuclear explosions
are statistically significant at the 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively.
Military spending is more responsive to the nuclear explosion measure than to the
Doomsday Clock measure.17A5.5 percent increase in the Doomsday Clock and a
3.8 percent decline in the number of nuclear explosions, which are the observed
annual average percent decreases in international tensions during the 1972–94
period, are each associated with a 1.1 percentage point decrease in the military
spending to GDP ratio. These estimates are quantitatively important because the
average ratio of military spending to GDP during the 1972–94 period was about 4
percent (see Table 1).
Neighbors’ military spending, the measure of regional or local tensions, has
the expected positive sign. A country spends less on its military if its neighbors
also spend less. This indicates that coordinated reductions in military spending
have multiplier effects and are beneficial to all countries. This evidence lends
support to the view that military spending is a “public bad” with negative exter-
nalities and spillovers across borders. It also lends support to the view that when
a country is outspending its neighbors to ensure its own security, the result can be
more insecurity, as the neighbors increase their military spending for the same
reason. The estimated parameters on the neighbors’ military spending are statisti-
cally significant at the 5 percent and 1 percent level when the measure of interna-
tional tensions are the Doomsday Clock and the number of nuclear explosions,
respectively (Table 2, Columns 1 and 3). A 1.5 percent reduction in neighbors’
military spending to GDP ratio, which is the observed average annual decline
during the 1972–94 period, is associated with about 0.7 percentage point decline
in the military spending to GDP ratio of an average country. Evaluated at the
sample average of all observations, these estimates translate into a decline in mili-
tary spending from an average of 4 percent of GDP to 3.3 percent of GDP. For
MILITARY SPENDING,THE PEACE DIVIDEND,AND FISCAL ADJUSTMENT
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15This is equivalent to including country dummies in the regressions. Using demeaned data allows
one not to estimate an additional 100 parameters (that is, number of countries) in the GMM estimation of
the simultaneous structural model. Note that between-country regressions were not estimated because the
two measures of international tensions vary across time only.
16Using lagged rather than contemporaneous measures of international tensions produces similar
results. This is an expected result since the evidence in the second part of section III showed the high
persistence of these measures. Further, it is plausible to treat the Doomsday Clock and number of nuclear
explosions as exogenous since a majority of countries in the sample are small developing countries (see
Appendix) that simply take international tensions as given.
17Measurement error is one possible reason for the lower point estimate for the Doomsday Clock. If
a variable is measured with error, which could be the case with respect to a survey-based measure of the
Doomsday Clock, one would expect the estimated coefficient to be biased toward zero. 
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Table 2. Structural Model with Two Measures of International Tensions
Number of
Doomsday Clock Nuclear Explosions
Ratio of  Ratio of  Ratio of  Ratio of 
military government military government
spending spending spending spending
to GDP to GDP to GDP to GDP
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Real per capita GDP 0.06*** –0.02 0.05*** 0.331
(8.61) (–1.59) (5.87) (0.34)
Urbanization ratio 0.13 0.31
(1.44) (3.65)
Age dependency ratio –0.45*** –0.32**
(–2.68) (–1.96)
Ratio of current account to GDP 0.05 0.04
(0.69) (0.57)
Civil war dummy 0.05 0.06
(1.23) (1.48)
International war dummy 0.14 0.06
(0.80) (0.50)
International tensions –0.05** 0.07***
(–1.85) (4.10)
Neighbors’ ratio of military  0.10** 0.12***
spending to GDP (2.38) (2.62)
IMF program dummy –0.03 (0.19)1 –0.03 –0.471
(–1.20) (0.13) (–1.23) (–0.32)
Ratio of military spending to GDP 0.31*** 0.06
(2.50) (0.54)
Ratio of government spending to GDP 0.38 0.98***
(1.09) (2.51)
Number of observations 1825 1825 1825 1825
P-value 0.10 0.10 0.18 0.18
Note: Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) is the estimation technique, using demeaned
data. Numbers in parentheses denote t-statistics, based on heteroskedastic, serial-correlation-
consistent standard errors. All variables are in logs except for dummy variables and the ratio of the
current account to GDP, which takes on positive and negative values. The instruments consist of a
constant and all the right-hand-side variables in the reduced form model. The instrument for the
interaction variable is IMF program dummy times lagged government spending. R-squared is not
a goodness-of-fit statistic in regressions estimated by the instrumental variable technique. The
p-value refers to test of overidentifying restrictions implied by the exogeneity of instruments.
1Multiplied by 100.
***significant at 1% level; and ** significant at 5% level.
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percent of GDP to 9.2 percent of GDP from 1979 to 1982, its neighbors increased
their military spending on average from 3.8 percent of GDPto 5.9 percent of GDP
during the same period. 
Military spending in countries with IMF-supported adjustment programs is,
on average, one percentage point lower than in countries without IMF programs.
However, the point estimate on the IMF dummy variable is not statistically signif-
icant at the conventional levels. 
The estimated parameter on overall government spending, when the
Doomsday Clock is the measure of international tensions (Table 2, Column 1), is
less than unity, suggesting that military spending has been resilient over the
sample period.18 Stated differently, the share of military spending in overall
government spending rises in response to exogenous cuts in government
spending.19 Government spending has a significant impact on military spending
during periods of fiscal adjustment. For example, the average annual decline in the
overall government spending to GDPratio from about 1.6 percent during 1972–85
to 0.4 percent during 1986–94 has resulted in a decline in the military spending to
GDP ratio from 2.6 percentage points to 0.6 percentage point. These estimates are
important, given the observed average military spending to GDP ratio of 4.2 and
3.6 percent during 1972–85 and 1986–94, respectively. Of course there are other
factors, given in the regression, that will increase military spending.
The impact of overall government spending on military spending when the
number of nuclear explosions is the measure of international tensions (Table 2,
Column 3) is much higher than when the Doomsday Clock is taken as the measure
of international tensions. The point estimate of 0.98 is not significantly different
from unity, suggesting that the share of military spending in overall government
spending does not change in response to exogenous changes in overall govern-
ment spending. Therefore, the question of resiliency cannot be resolved on the
basis of the evidence presented so far. As regards other variables in the regression,
wars are expected to lead to higher military spending, and not surprisingly this is
the finding in Table 2. Military spending tends to increase with per capita GDP,
and the associated point estimate is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
The regressions with the overall government spending to GDP ratio as the
dependent variable (Table 2, Columns 2 and 4) show, as expected, that govern-
ment outlays tend to increase with the urbanization ratio and higher military
spending.20 The current account surplus was found not to be statistically signifi-
cant and did not produce the expected negative sign. The point estimate on mili-
tary spending is positive and less than unity. This finding suggests that the share
of nonmilitary spending in overall government spending increases in response to
exogenous reductions in military spending. As regards other variables in the
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18See the next section for further assessment of this issue.
19See Franko (1994) for a descriptive analysis of budget-driven cuts in military spending in Latin
America.
20The ratio of current account to GDP was used since this is consistent with the theoretical model.
Results using the ratio of exports and imports to GDP, the variable used by Rodrik (1996), produces a
positive coefficient, the same sign as Rodrik’s result.
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spending, contrary to what one might expect. Apositive coefficient is expected on
the old age dependency ratio when the measure of government spending includes
general government spending. Because of data availability, however, the measure
actually used in the regression is central government spending, which can exclude
pension expenditures. The point estimate on per capita GDP changes sign,
depending on the measure of international tensions used, thus providing only
limited evidence in favor of Wagner’s law.21 The existence of an IMF-supported
program has not generally been associated with lower government outlays, given
the statistically insignificant relationship between the IMF dummy variable and
government spending. These results are consistent with those of Clements,
Rodriguez, and Schwartz (1998) showing that IMF-supported programs have not
been associated with reduced government expenditure. 
Resiliency of Military Spending
Previous results provided inconclusive evidence regarding the resiliency of mili-
tary spending. In addition, regressions did not take into account the fact that
resiliency may depend on whether a country has an IMF-supported program. This
is an important point since IMF-supported programs invariably seek to ensure the
consistency of government spending with the macroeconomic framework, and
often attempt to improve the composition of government expenditure.22 Hence,
the response of military spending to cuts in overall government spending is
expected to be different between countries with IMF-supported programs and
those without.23 To address both issues, an interaction variable, the product of the
IMF dummy variable and overall government spending to GDP ratio, is added to
the regression in the structural model with the military spending to GDP ratio as
the dependent variable. The results are shown in Table 3.
The estimated coefficient on the interaction variable exceeds unity and is
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This finding indicates that the impact
of government spending on military expenditure depends on whether a country
has an IMF-supported program. The elasticities of military spending with respect
to overall government spending, when there is an IMF-supported program, are
1.39 and 1.54, using the Doomsday Clock and the number of nuclear explosions
as the measures of international tensions, respectively. The estimated greater-than-
unity response shows that, other things being equal, cuts in the government
spending to GDP ratio imply a larger cut in the military spending to GDP ratio in
countries with IMF-supported programs than in those without such programs.
Hence, for countries with IMF-supported programs military spending is not
resilient. This finding is consistent with the pattern of fiscal adjustment and mili-
tary expenditures described in Schiff, Gupta, and Clements (1998). It also indi-
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Rodrik (1996); and Commander, Davoodi, and Lee (1997).
22See Abed and others (1998).
23The presence of an intercept IMF dummy variable cannot address this issue. 
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Table 3. Structural Model with Two Measures of International Tensions
and an Interaction Term
Number of 
Doomsday Clock Nuclear Explosions
Ratio of  Ratio of  Ratio of  Ratio of 
military government military government
spending spending spending spending
to GDP to GDP to GDP to GDP
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Real per capita GDP 0.07*** –0.04*** 0.07*** –0.02**
(9.67) (–3.94) (7.78) (–2.13)
Urbanization ratio 0.09 0.20**
(0.94) (2.06)
Age dependency ratio –0.70*** –0.67**
(–3.77) (–3.81)
Ratio of current account to GDP 0.08 0.09
(1.02) (1.09)
Civil war dummy 0.04 0.05
(0.92) (0.94)
International war dummy 0.08 0.17
(0.34) (0.71)
International tensions –0.05* 0.03
(–1.63) (1.53)
Neighbors’ ratio of military  0.05 0.07
spending to GDP (1.16) (1.40)
IMF program dummy 0.541 (–0.01) 0.02 –0.02
(0.23) (–0.85) (0.82) (–1.60)
Ratio of military spending to GDP 0.61*** 0.39***
(5.13) (3.82)
Ratio of government spending to GDP –0.4 –0.34
(–0.82) (–0.60)
IMF program dummy government 1.79*** 1.88***
spending-GDP ratio (3.72) (3.39)
Number of observations 1740 1740 1740 1740
P-value 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00
Note: Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) is the estimation technique, using demeaned
data. Numbers in parentheses denote t-statistics, based on heteroskedastic, serial-correlation-
consistent standard errors. All variables are in logs except for dummy variables and the ratio of the
current account to GDP, which takes on positive and negative values. The instruments consist of a
constant and all the right-hand-side variables in the reduced-form model. The instrument for the
interaction variable is IMF program dummy times lagged government spending. R-squared is not
a goodness-of-fit statistic in regressions estimated by the instrumental variable technique. The
p-value refers to test of overidentifying restrictions implied by the exogeneity of instruments.
1Multiplied by 100.
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; and * significant at 10 percent level.
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dend, measured in terms of a higher share of nonmilitary spending in overall
government spending, than countries without such programs.24 IMF-supported
programs therefore affect the composition of government spending. For example,
the data show that during 1989–93 when Uganda had an IMF-supported program,
military spending fell from 2.3 percent of GDP to 1.6 percent of GDP while
government spending increased from 13.7 percent of GDPto 20.1 percent of GDP.
The data for Uganda also show that during the entire 1972–94 period, government
and military spending as a fraction of GDP were lower with IMF-supported
programs than without: Ratios of government and military spending to GDP were
24 and 3.5 percent, respectively, with no IMF-supported programs as compared
with 16 and 2.1 percent, respectively, with IMF-supported programs. 
The Reduced-Form Model
The reduced-form model, which summarizes the direct effects of the exogenous
variables on military spending and the indirect effects exercised through the
channel of government spending, provides results that are generally consistent
with those obtained from the structural model, but vary in important ways. Results
of the reduced-form regressions (equations (13) and (14)) are shown in Table 4.
Countries with higher real per capita income, a higher current account surplus, a
high degree of urbanization, and a high age dependency ratio tend to have higher
military outlays. Unlike the structural model estimates, in the reduced form the
civil war variable is significant at the 10 percent level; and much like the struc-
tural model, the impact of international wars is positive, but not statistically signif-
icant. Reduced international tensions are also associated with lower military
outlays using both measures of international tensions. The point estimate for either
measure is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
The reduced-form model shows a larger impact of the easing of international
tensions on military spending than the structural model, particularly for the
Doomsday Clock measure. Specifically, a 5.5 percent increase in the Doomsday
Clock and a 3.8 percent decline in the number of nuclear explosions, which are the
same experiments conducted with the structural model, are associated with a 1.5
and 0.9 percentage point decline in the military spending to GDPratio, respectively. 
The reduced form also confirms that the easing of regional tensions, as
measured by reductions in neighbors’ military spending, is associated with lower
military outlays. The magnitude of the impact of neighbors’ military spending is
considerable. A1.5 percent reduction in neighbors’military spending to GDPratio
(the observed average annual decline during the 1972–94 period) is associated
with a decline in military spending of 0.9 percentage point from 4 percent of GDP
to 3.1 percent of GDP. The magnitude of this decline is larger than the decline in
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since the structural model and the econometric findings show that there were indeed other sources of the
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manifest itself in terms of economic gains besides higher nonmilitary spending. 
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the structural model (by 0.2 or 0.3 percentage point) for the identical reduction in
neighbors’ military spending of 1.5 percent. The reduced-form model combines
the positive interaction between military spending and overall government
spending present in the structural model, and produces a higher elasticity of mili-
tary spending with respect to neighbors’ military spending. Specifically, in the
regressions in the structural model with the Doomsday Clock and the number of
nuclear explosions as the measures of international tensions, these elasticities are
0.10 and 0.12, respectively. The corresponding elasticities for the reduced-form
model are 0.15 and 0.16.
Table 4. Reduced-Form Model with Two Measures 
of International Tensions
Number of 
Doomsday Clock Nuclear Explosions
Ratio of  Ratio of  Ratio of  Ratio of 
military government military government
spending spending spending spending
to GDP to GDP to GDP to GDP
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Real per capita GDP 0.06*** 0.581 0.05*** 0.631
(8.12) (1.05) (5.51) (1.12)
Urbanization ratio 0.45*** 0.14** 0.83*** 0.16**
(3.68) (2.09) (5.23) (2.11)
Age dependency ratio 0.22 –0.53*** 0.08 –0.54***
(1.18) (–4.03) (0.35) (–3.99)
Ratio of current account to GDP 0.12 0.07 0.12 0.07
(0.93) (1.00) (0.96) (0.95)
Civil war dummy 0.07** 0.02 –0.09 0.02
(1.74) (0.46) (–1.60) (0.54)
International war dummy 0.11 0.03 –0.02 0.04
(0.60) (0.24) (–0.10) (0.35)
International tensions –0.07*** –0.04*** 0.06*** –0.201
(–2.99) (–3.35) (4.22) (–0.21)
Neighbors’ ratio of military  0.15*** –0.791 0.16*** 0.01
spending to GDP (3.97) (–0.28) (3.65) (0.36)
IMF program dummy –0.03 –0.631 –0.24*** –0.461
(–1.46) (–0.43) (–4.32) (–0.31)
Number of observations 1825 1825 1825 1825
R-squared 0.15 0.05 0.10 0.04
Note: Ordinary least square (OLS) is the estimation technique, using demeaned data. Numbers
in parentheses denote t-statistics, based on heteroskedastic, serial-correlation-consistent standard
errors. All variables are in logs except for the dummy variables and the ratio of current account
balance to GDP, which takes on positive and negative values.
1Multiplied by 100.
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; and * significant at 10 percent level.
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The relative magnitude of the point estimates of both sources of military
tensions indicates that reduction in these tensions has increased the share of
nonmilitary spending in total government spending. This is consistent with the rise
in the ratio of nonmilitary spending to GDP of 2 percentage points from an
average of 23.3 percent of GDP during 1972–85 to 25.3 percent of GDP during
1986–94 (see Table 1). This is similar to the increase for the 1972–89 and 1990–94
periods.
As with the structural model, IMF-supported programs, as proxied by an IMF
dummy variable, are associated with lower military outlays. The statistical signif-
icance of the IMF dummy variable differs according to which measure of interna-
tional tensions is used in the regression. When the Doomsday Clock is the measure
of international tensions, the point estimate on the IMF dummy is significant at the
10 percent level under the one-sided alternative hypothesis that military spending
is lower in countries with IMF-supported programs.25 But when the number of
nuclear explosions is the measure of international tensions, the point estimate
becomes significant at the 1 percent level using either a one- or two-tail test. The
magnitude of the impact of IMF-supported programs is quantitatively important.
Other things being equal, military spending in countries with IMF-supported
programs is, on average, 1 or 1.3 percent of GDP lower than in countries without
such programs.26
As regards the government spending regression, results are also consistent
with the structural model, including the fragility of Wagner’s law, the negative
impact of the age dependency ratio, and the insignificance of the current account
balance. Countries with IMF-supported programs also have a lower overall
government spending to GDPratio. The point estimates are not statistically signif-
icant at the conventional statistical levels, but are quantitatively important.
Government spending is, on average, 1 percent of GDP lower in program coun-
tries. The average government spending to GDP ratio is 28 percent.
Sources of the Peace Dividend
As stated earlier, a novelty of this paper is the decomposition of the sources of the
peace dividend into global, regional, and country-specific factors. In this regard, this
section of the paper answers the following question: How much of the decline in mili-
tary spending can be attributed to each of these factors? Two time periods are used to
calculate the decline in military spending: changes in military spending between
1972–85 and 1986–94 and between 1972–89 and 1990–94. The first time period
corresponds to the widely documented decline in military spending that started in
1985 (Hewitt, 1993; Knight, Loayza, and Villanueva, 1996; and Schiff, Gupta, and
Clements, 1998); whereas the second period corresponds to the end of the Cold War
in 1989, which was also the year the Doomsday Clock was reset to measure the
marked decline in international tensions. The point estimates in the reduced-form
25The p-value associated with this alternative hypothesis is 7 percent. 
26These are e0.03 and e0.24, respectively, where 0.03 and 0.24 are the estimated parameters on the IMF
dummy variable in Table 4, Columns 1 and 3.
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contribution of each factor to the decline in military spending over each of the two
periods. The decomposition analysis essentially poses a counterfactual question: How
much higher would military spending have been had the international or regional
tensions remained as high as those observed before the end of the Cold War?
The results of the decomposition are presented in Table 5 for two measures of
international tensions and the two time periods, producing four panels. In each panel,
contributions of IMF-supported adjustment programs, neighbors’ military spending,
and other economic variables to declines in military spending are also shown explic-
itly. These results can be summarized as follows. First, the decompositions show that
the explanatory variables in the reduced-form regressions explain a large fraction of
the drop in military spending between the two periods, ranging from a low of 50
percent to a high of 85 percent. Second, the drop in military spending due to the easing
of international tensions—the global source of the peace dividend—is quantitatively
more important after the end of the Cold War than before. Specifically, the Doomsday
Clock explains about 9 percent of the drop in military spending between 1972–85 and
1986–94, but 34 percent of the drop between 1972–89 and 1990–94. The number of
nuclear explosions explains about 50 percent of the drop in military spending between
1972–85 and 1986–94, but 66 percent of the drop between 1972–89 and 1990–94.
These findings are consistent with the view that the collapse of the former Soviet
Union has reduced the role of tensions among its regional “surrogate” nations, since
the Soviet Union is no longer there to support its surrogates. Accordingly, the “West”
or NATO also feels no need to do the same with its surrogates.
Third, the drop in military spending due to the easing of regional tensions—
the regional source of the peace dividend—is also more important after the end of
the Cold War than before. Although the regional source of the peace dividend is
not as quantitatively important as the global source, it still accounts for about 23
percent of the drop in military spending. This finding shows that although the Cold
War has ended, regional tensions can have the potential of escalating military
spending. Fourth, IMF-supported adjustment programs account for up to 11
percent of the drop in military spending between the two periods.27 Fifth,
economic factors also contribute to changes in military spending. Economic
declines have tended to reduce military spending, which is consistent with the
findings of Hewitt (1993), whereas the increased trend toward urbanization in
developing countries tends to increase these outlays. The net effect varies
according to which measure of international tensions is used in the regression.
V. Conclusions
This paper has presented evidence that the easing of international and regional
tensions is systematically related to subsequent reductions in military spending
and the higher share of nonmilitary spending in total spending. The evidence lends
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tensions because the estimated parameter on the IMF dummy variable is small and statistically insignifi-
cant (Table 4, Column 1).
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support to the previous studies of the peace dividend, which simply assumed that
improvements in global and regional security will lead to cuts in military
spending. In addition, the significance of regional tensions, as proxied by neigh-
bors’ military spending, documented the notion that military spending is a public
bad; increasing military spending will not necessarily lead to more security for a
country since its neighbors are likely to follow the same strategy. The evidence
also shows that peace is a public good; mutual reductions in military spending
across borders have multiplier effects that are beneficial to all parties concerned. 
The second finding of the paper concerned the impact of IMF-supported
adjustment programs on military and nonmilitary spending. IMF-supported
programs affect the composition of government spending. In countries with IMF
programs, the ratio of military spending to GDP is, on average, one percentage
Table 5. Decomposition of Changes in Military Spending Using
Two Measures of International Tensions, by Period
(In percent)
1972–85 and 1986–941 1972–89 and 1990–941
Average Percent of Average Percent of
change actual change actual
Actual military spending–GDP –15.4 100.0 –18.2 100.0
Predicted military spending–GDP ratio –8.0 51.5 –15.5 85.1
Of which
Doomsday Clock –1.3 8.6 –6.3 34.3
Neighbors’ military spending–GDP ratio –3.7 23.7 –4.5 24.5
IMF program dummy –0.2 1.5 –0.3 1.4
Other variables2 –2.7 17.7 –4.5 24.8
Unexplained residual –7.5 48.5 –2.7 14.9
1972–85 and 1986–943 1972–89 and 1990–943
Average Percent of Average Percent of
change actual change actual
Actual military spending–GDP –15.4 100.0 –18.2 100.0
Predicted military spending–GDP ratio –7.7 50.2 –14.5 79.4
Of which
Nuclear explosions –7.7 50.0 –12.0 65.8
Neighbors’ military spending–GDP ratio –3.9 25.3 –4.8 26.2
IMF program dummy –1.8 11.8 –2.1 11.5
Other variables4 5.7 –36.9 4.4 –24.1
Unexplained residual –7.7 49.8 –3.8 20.6
1Based on the reduced-form regression, Table 4, Column 1, and the data used in the regression.
2Sum of contributions from other variables in the regressions given in Table 4, Column 1,
besides those listed above.
3Based on the reduced-form regression, Table 4, Column 3, and the data used in the regression.
4Sum of contributions from other variables in the regressions given in Table 4, Column 3,
besides those listed above.
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important since the average ratio of military spending to GDP is about 4 percent.
Cuts in overall government spending imply a larger cut in military spending in
countries with IMF-supported programs than in those without such programs. 
The third finding of the paper concerned the relative importance of the global
and regional sources of the peace dividend as well as the existence of IMF-
supported adjustment programs. The easing of international and regional tensions
has accounted for up to 66 percent and 26 percent of the decline in military
spending respectively; and IMF programs accounted for up to 11 percent of the
decline. The remainder is accounted for by other economic factors and an unex-
plained residual.
It should be pointed out that these decompositions may understate the impor-
tance of the two measures of international and regional tensions and overstate the
importance of IMF-supported adjustment programs. Owing to a lack of other rele-
vant variables, the sample excluded the transition economies that have witnessed
the largest declines in their military spending since the end of the Cold War. In
addition, countries involved in an armed conflict typically do not have any IMF
programs that will bias the results in favor of a large role for a program. And coun-
tries that are not involved in an armed conflict and have an IMF program find it
perhaps easier to cut military spending.
The key policy implications of this paper are as follows. Sustained reductions
in international and regional tensions would lead to declines in military spending,
ensure a more secure world, and achieve a large peace dividend. Different coun-
tries would no doubt make different choices about how to utilize the resulting
peace dividend. This choice would depend, among other things, upon the nature
of political demands on the budget, the geographic location of the country, the
nature of military alliances, and the extent of the past defense buildup. These are
indeed some reasons that explain why no consensus has so far emerged on the
widely posed question, “what happened to the peace dividend?” Furthermore,
reducing military spending is important for fiscal adjustment, but fiscal adjust-
ment is also an effective method for reducing military spending, particularly in
countries with IMF-supported adjustment programs. In nonprogram countries,
fiscal adjustment is possible, but military spending may be resilient to cuts in
government spending. Finally, the importance of the regional source of the peace
dividend shows that, despite the end of the Cold War, regional tensions have the
potential of escalating military spending, jeopardizing the quality of fiscal adjust-
ment, and reducing the magnitude of the peace dividend.
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List of Countries Included in the Paper*
Algeria Guatemala Panama





Benin Indonesia Saudi Arabia
Bolivia Iran Senegal
Botswana Israel Sierra Leone
Brazil Italy Somalia




Central African Rep. Lesotho Sweden
Chad Liberia Switzerland




Costa Rica Mali Tunisia
Côte d’Ivoire Mauritania Turkey
Cyprus Mexico Uganda
Denmark Morocco United Arab Emirates
Dominican Republic Mozambique United Kingdom
Ecuador Myanmar United States
Egypt Nepal Uruguay
El Salvador Netherlands Venezuela






*These countries are referenced in Tables 1, 2, 4, and 5.
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